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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, a considerable amount of research focused on fiscal transparency and 
supported the idea that it matters for governance (Heald, 2013). Although fiscal transparency is “more 
often invoked than defined” (Hood, 2006), p.3) a number of alternative definitions have been provided 
by scholars (James E Alt & Lassen, 2006a, 2006b; Bastida & Benito, 2007; Kopits & Craig, 1998; 
Poterba & Von Hagen, 1999), all basically sharing the idea that it consists in the timely and systematic 
disclosure of  internationally comparable and reliable information concerning governments’ budget data 
(Kopits & Craig, 1998).  
The provision of information concerning governments’ financial position may significantly reduce the 
opportunistic behavior of policymakers by minimizing voters’ fiscal illusions (James E Alt & Lassen, 
2006a, 2006b; Debrun & Kumar, 2007; Von Hagen & Harden, 1996). Visibility of public expenditure 
and revenue makes policymakers accountable for their actions, thus promoting good governance, 
alleviating corruption and securing better resource allocation (Benito & Bastida, 2009; Hameed, 2005; 
Haque & Neanidis, 2009). For these reasons, fiscal transparency “is widely regarded as an important 
precondition for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude. 
[and] is a necessary condition for sound economic policy” (de Renzio & Wehner, 2015; Kopits & Craig, 
1998), p. 1-2). Moreover, fiscal transparency is supposed to be positively evaluated by financial markets 
and therefore should have a positive impact on credit ratings and lower the cost of sovereign 
borrowing (Arbatli & Escolano, 2015; Bernoth & Wolff, 2008; T. Wang, Shields, & Wang, 2014). 
A wide variety of measures of fiscal transparency have been proposed by international organizations 
(such as the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and non-governmental organizations such as the International Budget 
Partnership (IBP), Transparency International). Also some scholars provided their own measures by 
relying on available information about national budgetary practices and fiscal disclosure (Andreula & 
Chong, 2015; Arbatli & Escolano, 2015; Bastida & Benito, 2007; Bernoth & Wolff, 2008; Dabla-Norris 
et al., 2010; Hameed, 2005; Weber, 2012). 
The evidence brought by these many indexes reveals that fiscal transparency is rather heterogeneous 
across countries. The investigation of the sources of such an heterogeneity, indeed, motivated a number 
of researches devoted to the identification of the determinants of fiscal transparency. Nevertheless, 
most of the existing empirical literature on this topic is based on cross-sectional (James E. Alt, Lassen, 
& Rose, 2006; Andreula & Chong, 2015; Bastida & Benito, 2007; Harrison & Sayogo, 2014; Ríos, 
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Bastida, & Benito, 2014; Tejedo-Romero & de Araujo, 2015; Wehner & de Renzio, 2013) data  and this 
definitely complicates the identification of determinants of fiscal transparency. 
In this paper we take the analysis of the determinants of fiscal transparency one step further by 
performing a panel data analysis (2003-2013) that considers a wide set of democracies and exploits the 
fiscal transparency measure recently provided by the IMF database on fiscal reporting (R. F. Wang, 
Irwin, & Murara, 2015). By relying  on a longitudinal structure we are able to propose static and 
dynamic panel regression models that allow to disentangle the causal effect of different variables on 
fiscal transparency.  
Our analysis is specifically focused on the identification of political determinants of fiscal transparency. 
Indeed, since fiscal reforms towards the path of transparency have to be enforced by political actors, 
the investigation of political variables that trigger fiscal transparency is crucial in order to understand 
sources of transparency enhancements. As James E. Alt et al. (2006) suggest, “although politicians may 
not have incentive to increase transparency, it nevertheless does sometimes happen” (p.34). In this 
perspective, our investigation is aimed at identifying the political setting under which this happens.  
Our analysis expressly focuses on three variables that contribute to the definition of this political 
setting. First, ideological orientation of government. The existing literature has found some evidence 
that ideology matters in conditioning fiscal transparency (Sol, 2013) which, nevertheless, has been 
contradicted by other studies (James E. Alt et al., 2006; Ríos et al., 2014). Second, government control 
over the legislature. There are reasons to believe that “when leaders wield control over the 
parliamentary agenda they typically resist or weaken transparency [while] when leaders lack control over 
the parliamentary agenda, they become more likely to yield to strong transparency measures” 
(Michener, 2015). We test this hypothesis by looking at the effect on fiscal transparency exerted by the 
share of legislative seats held by government parties.  Third, political competition. Part of the existing 
literature suggests that fiscal transparency arises as the result of competition among political parties 
since alternative political forces ask for tools of monitoring spending behavior of governments (James 
E Alt & Lassen, 2006a, 2006b; James E. Alt et al., 2006; Wehner & de Renzio, 2013). Nevertheless, a 
negative effect of political competition on fiscal transparency is also possible since the higher political 
competition is, the higher is governments’ incentive to limit the disclosure of information potentially 
usable to criticize their actions (Messick, 2002). Our analysis provides a test of these alternative 
hypotheses about the impact of political competition on fiscal transparency.  
According to our results, political factors do cause the evolution of fiscal transparency over time. In 
line with the predictions made by the literature, we find that government control over the Parliament 
exerts a negative causal impact on fiscal transparency. Furthermore we find that legislature 
fragmentation exerts a negative effect on fiscal transparency which is consistent with the idea that 
governments react to political competition by reducing the accessibility to information. Finally, while  
government ideology is found to be correlated with fiscal transparency in our static models, with left-
wing parties definitely more positively oriented towards transparency,  dynamic models do not confirm 
it. 
These results are potentially interesting for both citizens and international organizations who investigate  
how to trigger improvements in the provision of information by their governments or to remove 
obstacles that impede it. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief survey of the existing 
literature on fiscal transparency determinants. Data used in our empirical elaborations and the 
methodology applied in order to carry out the analysis are presented in section 3. Section 4, instead,  
illustrates and discusses the results obtained through our elaborations. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Politics and fiscal transparency: what do we already know? 
The existing literature on factors driving disclosure of fiscal information may be divided into two main 
branches. On the one hand, papers focusing on within country fiscal transparency and its determinants, 
based on regional or local data (looking at recently released studies, Spanish data were analyzed by: 
Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero (2012); Gandía and Archidona (2008); García and García-García (2010); 
Guillamón, Bastida, and Benito (2011); Sol (2013), U.S. State-level data were considered by James E. 
Alt et al. (2006); Chinese data were investigated by Deng, Peng, and Wang (2013); New Zealand data 
were taken into account by Laswad, Fisher, and Oyelere (2005); Brazilian States were analyzed in 
Zuccolotto and Teixeira (2014)). On the other hand, country-level analyses (among those recently 
released: Andreula and Chong (2015); de Renzio and Angemi (2012); Harrison and Sayogo (2014); Ríos 
et al. (2014); Wehner and de Renzio (2013), which are definitely less widespread. 
Alongside economic and institutional factors, such as economic wealth, financial condition of the 
public authority and type of legal system, political factors are also considered among main drivers of 
fiscal transparency. Indeed, fiscal transparency reforms are carried out by governments and the political 
setting in which governments act can incentivize them or alternatively discourage them from  
promoting the disclosure of fiscal information.   
The existing literature suggests that three main features of the political system have the most  
significant impact on fiscal transparency: ideological orientation of government, government control 
over the legislature and political competition. 
                                             
(a) Ideological orientation of government 
The evidence about the effect of political orientation on fiscal transparency is mixed. While some 
contributions do not find any effect of ideology on fiscal disclosure (James E. Alt et al., 2006; Ríos et 
al., 2014) others support the opposite. Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) show that citizens’ ideology 
matters for transparency of local governments, Guillamón et al. (2011) find that the right-wing ideology 
of municipal ruling party negatively affects transparency and Sol (2013) finds a similar result. Indeed 
this provides support to the argument by Ferejohn (1999) according to which left-wing governments 
enhance transparency to defend a larger public sector. Hence the following hypothesis can be 
formulated: 
H1: Left-wing ideology of governments has a positive effect on fiscal transparency  
 
(b) Government control over the Legislature 
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In governments’ perspective, the benefits arising from secrecy may outweigh the cost of information 
openness (Hazell & Worthy, 2010; Michener, 2015; Roberts, 2006). Therefore “when leaders wield 
control over the parliamentary agenda they typically resist or weaken transparency [while] when leaders 
lack control over the parliamentary agenda, they become more likely to yield to strong transparency 
measures” (Michener, 2015). Following this reasoning, we expect that government support in 
parliaments, as measured by the seat share of government’s parties (GOV_SUP), negatively affects 
fiscal transparency: 
 
H2: The stronger is the ruling parties’ control over the Legislature, the less likely fiscal transparency measures are 
promoted. 
 
(c) Political competition 
Political competition can also be a strong predictor of fiscal transparency. Indeed, parties that compete 
with the government or within the government may call for more transparency in order to enhance 
their control over governmental activities. Not surprisingly, empirical analyses do find a beneficial 
effect of political competition on fiscal disclosure, albeit with some exceptions (Zuccolotto & Teixeira, 
2014). James E. Alt et al. (2006) as well as Ríos et al. (2014) observe that political competition tends to 
increase fiscal transparency. Wehner and de Renzio (2013) find that partisan fragmentation positively 
influences budgetary information disclosure when free and fair elections take place. Andreula and 
Chong (2015) show that political competition exerts a positive role on fiscal transparency.  
 
On the basis of these contributions, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3: Transparency is enhanced in highly fragmented party systems. 
2 Data and empirical approach 
A number of country-level fiscal transparency indexes, provided by both international institutions and 
academic researchers, exists. All these indexes measure countries’ performance in fiscal transparency, 
namely in dimensions that contribute to “public openness in government institutions, fiscal policy 
intentions, public sector accounts, indicators, and forecasts” (Kopits & Craig, 1998).   
Although there is a proliferation of available transparency measures, the unevenness in country and 
time interval coverage has limited the spread of studies on country-level fiscal transparency 
determinants (Heald, 2013).  
Majority of empirical analyses that investigate fiscal transparency determinants and effects use Open 
Budget Survey (OBS) data in order to measure transparency (de Renzio & Angemi, 2012; Harrison & 
Sayogo, 2014; Ríos et al., 2014; Wehner & de Renzio, 2013).  
Other studies, instead, relied on other sources to develop their own indexes of fiscal transparency. 
Some of these studies are based on the IMF’s fiscal transparency Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) (Andreula & Chong, 2015; Hameed, 2005). Others (Dabla-Norris et al., 
2010) use multiple sources such as the International Budget Partnership (IBP), Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) reports and ROSC. Scholars also used measures calculated starting 
from countries’ compliance with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) requirements (Bastida & Benito, 2007) or from the OECD/World Bank survey of budget 
practices (Bernoth & Wolff, 2008). James E Alt and Lassen (2006b) index is also partially constructed 
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on variables belonging to the OECD survey but, in order to derive an aggregate indicator they also rely 
on survey responses of a research specific questionnaire. 
Finally, a group of studies propose alternative ways to measure transparency. This is the case of Debrun 
and Kumar (2007) whose transparency index aims to measure  absence of creative accounting 
calculated as 1 minus the median coefficient of correlation (in absolute value, 15-year rolling 
correlation) between stock-flow adjustments and the overall budget balance in percentage of GDP over 
2004-1990. Kaufmann and Bellver (2005) using multiple sources, construct an overall transparency 
index based on the weighted average of two sub- indices of transparency (namely 
economic/institutional transparency and political transparency), calculated by using Unobserved 
Component Model (UCM).  
Differently from these previous empirical analyses, ours is drawn on a fiscal transparency measure 
provided by the IMF database on fiscal reporting (R. F. Wang et al., 2015). Consistently with the 
availability of the political variables we are interested in studying, this measure is available for 36 
countries1 observed over the period 2003-2014 for a total of 396 observations. The major benefit 
arising from using this measure of fiscal transparency is that it is available for a wide set of countries 
and for multiple years; indeed, this allows to build a panel dataset whose use in an empirical analysis is 
crucial in order to provide insights on the causal link connecting political variables to fiscal 
transparency. 
The fiscal transparency measure provided by R. F. Wang et al. (2015) is an aggregate index based on 
information reported to the IMF’s Statistic Department by member countries. It ranges from 1 to 100, 
in ascending order of fiscal transparency. Its trend for each country included in the dataset can be seen 
in fig. 1. 
 
[FIG. 1] 
 
While some countries show the same level of fiscal transparency during the years covered, most 
countries experienced some variation of fiscal reporting, represented both by increases and decreases of 
GFS transparency index. As shown in tab. 1 the average level of the GFS indicator is 49.80, with a 
higher standard deviation between (18.44) than within (15.29) countries. From 2003 to 2013 the cross-
state GFS score increases on average from 36.42 to 56.33, as shown by the average trend by year in fig. 
2. 
 
[TAB. 1] 
 
[FIG. 2] 
                                                 
1
 Countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, United Kingdom. 
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In order to study the political drivers of fiscal transparency we build a set of covariates to be used in 
our regression analyses. More specifically, three variables were selected in order to measure the political 
drivers of fiscal transparency whose impact has been hypothesized in the previous section.  
A first variable observes cabinet ideological composition. As it is reported in tab.2, this is a categorical 
variable that has five modalities: hegemony of right-wing, dominance of right wing, balance of power 
between left and right, dominance of social-democratic/left parties and hegemony of social-
democratic/left parties. 
A second variable measures government control over the parliament. This control is measured by 
looking at the share of seats in the legislature held by parties in government. In our sample the lowest 
value observed is 0%, which is found for Italy in 2012, when a technocratic government took office 
with the mandate of facing the economic crisis. The governments with the highest control over the 
Parliament in terms of seat held is the one of Switzerland in 2003, that reports the value of  86.44%. 
In order to measure political competition, we followed Wehner and de Renzio (2013) and use one 
variable that captures parties fractionalization in the legislature. More specifically we relied on the 
original Rae legislative fractionalization index (Rae, 1968) whose original values ranging between 0 and 
1 were multiplied by 100 to make the index consistent with the scale of the dependent variable. Since it 
is based on the share of seats of parties, lower values indicate less parties sitting in the legislative 
assembly, to a minimum of 0 in a hypothetic single party with 100% of seats composition. 
Our set of political regressors is completed by one dummy taking the value of one in case of electoral 
years. Since over the time span covered by this dataset there have been elections and changes in 
governments, a control for electoral years seems appropriate.  
 
[TAB. 2] 
 
Additional socio-economic controls used are GDP per capita (PPP constant 2011 international $) from 
the World Bank2, and GDP growth, fiscal deficit and population, whose source is again the 
Comparative Political Dataset. 
[TAB. 3] 
 
The basic specification of the model used to test the effect of our interest variables on fiscal 
transparency can be written as: 
GFSit= αi + β1 POLVARit + β2 POLVARit-3 + β3 Xit + δt YEARt + υit 
where GFSit is the level of fiscal transparency of country i in year t, αi are country fixed effect, 
POLVARit is a vector including our political variables of interest observed in country i in year t (RAE, 
                                                 
2 Extracted January 14th 2016. 
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GOV_SUP, GOV_PARTY). POLVAR is a vector including our political variables observed at t and t-
3 “in order to capture a slower pace of institutional change, being fiscal transparency an institutional 
device” (Debrun & Kumar, 2007). Xit is a vector of control variables for each country-year, YEARt are 
t dummy variables for each year of observation and υit is the error term. The modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed regression model results in a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity of the error terms, therefore the regressions were performed using robust standard 
errors. Indeed the lagged variables prevent the correlation of the error term with the contemporaneous 
variable, which would lead to biased estimates, but at the same time the inclusion of lags restricts the 
time dimension, and force us to perform the analysis on fewer observations. 
Dynamic model 
In order to assess a causal relation between the dependent and the independent variable we can exploit 
the longitudinal nature of our data performing a dynamic analysis. Furthermore testing the static model 
for serial correlation strongly confirms that the current values of GFS depend on past values. The 
dynamic panel models are mostly based on the Arellano-Bond (AB) estimation, which uses the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) on a set of instrumental variables, which usually are the 
differenced regressors. The Arellano-Bover or Blundell-Bond estimator improves AB by making the 
additional assumption that first differences of instruments are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This 
estimator – called system GMM – builds a system of two equations and allows the introduction of 
more instruments, improving efficiency. Here we use two-step estimation with Windmeijer corrected 
standard errors, which is seemingly superior to cluster-robust one-step estimation (Roodman, 2009). 
The specification may be written as: 
GFSit= αi + γ1 GFSit-1 + β1 POLVARit + β2 POLVARit-3 + β3 Xit + δt YEARt + υit 
which is equal to the notation of the static model except for the inclusion of the first lag of GFS in 
order to account for the first-order autocorrelation of the dependent variable. 
In building our specification we are aware that we stand on a thin line, since a smaller number of 
instruments produces a smaller bias, while a full set of instrument almost always increases the efficiency 
of the estimates. Furthermore we have to face a issue related with the size of our sample and the 
number of interest variables. Indeed the number of instruments grows with the number of variables 
and is quadratic in T, while it has to be at least lower than the number of units in the dataset – which is 
36. This drives us to excogitate a solution both on the number of instruments and on the number of 
variables included in the model. As for what concerns the former we reduce the lags to be used as 
instruments and collapse the instruments matrix. For addressing the latter we limit the number of 
variables included in the specification analyzing one interest variable at a time, while keeping the 
macroeconomic controls described above. 
3 Findings 
Static model 
In the static model we test the current and third lags of a set of our political variables of interest. The 
results are shown in tab. 4. The current values of GOV_PARTY indicate that a dominance and an 
hegemony of left parties are associated with higher values of transparency, even though the amplitude 
of this link is not tightly estimated (10% significant). These results are in line with Ríos et al. (2014) and 
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confirm that ideology matters in fiscal policy concerns. However, the lagged values are not statistically 
different from zero, so as the coefficient associated with the circumstance of an election. The most 
precise point estimate is the coefficient of the lagged value of government support, which is negative 
and significant at 5%. Governing parties are less prone to fiscal transparency (confirming H2) as, 
following James E. Alt et al. (2006) argument, incumbent may decide to maintain a low-transparency 
regime in order to enjoying the informational advantages afforded by low transparency. Interestingly 
the coefficient for the current value of RAE is significant and negative, while the lagged value is 
associated to a positive and significant coefficient (both at 10%). This result, albeit not in line with 
majority of empirical literature, does not confirm our third hypothesis and suggests that fractionalized 
legislatives are more prone to fiscal profligacy and have less interest in pursuing fiscal transparency 
(Roubini & Sachs, 1989).  
Dynamic model 
In the static model an hegemony and a dominance of left parties was associated with a  positive and 
significant coefficient. The dynamic version of the model raises some computational issues, since the 
categorical nature of this interest variable increases considerably the number of instruments, so that 
increased caution is needed. Using the same specification we used for legislative fractionalization and 
government support indeed the number of instruments explodes to 60, well beyond the rule of thumb 
represented by the number of subjects (Roodman, 2009). Using just the difference of the second lag for 
GOV_PARTY the number of instruments is still too high (44 instruments), so we use less lags of the 
dependent and the control variables for the estimation of the system and the levels equation, which 
results in 37 instruments. However with this specification the coefficients are very poorly estimated, 
and their values are not statistically different from zero.  
The effect of strength of government support keeps the same negative sign as the static model, 
however its statistical precision becomes a bit lower, since in this specification the point estimate of the 
associated coefficient is significant just at 10%. Indeed as above this model identifies a negative causal 
effect of the support of government three years before and the current level of fiscal transparency. The 
effect is lower than the one of fractionalization but still notable, as a one standard deviation increase of 
government support cause the fiscal transparency index to be lower of 1.18 points. Along our second 
hypothesis our results confirm that in stronger governments the benefits of secrecy outweigh the cost 
of budgetary disclosure. 
The coefficients associated with the current and lagged index of fractionalization keep the same signs as 
the static model, however the positive association with the three times lagged value is not statistically 
different from zero, while the negative coefficient of the current value is significant at the 5%. Indeed 
we detect a causal nexus between legislative fractionalization and fiscal transparency: a higher 
fractionalization will cause a lower fiscal transparency. The magnitude of this effect is such that an 
increase of one standard deviation of the index of fractionalization causes a 5.5 point decrease of fiscal 
transparency index. Against our third hypothesis we conclude that more parties in parliament imply less 
transparency, as the fragmentation problem suggests (Leachman, Rosas, Lange, & Bester, 2007). Indeed 
when legislative fractionalization is high the opposition parties may not be a credible threat to 
incumbents (Berliner, 2014), which may choose secrecy over transparency. 
[TAB. 4] 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper examined the determinants of fiscal transparency in 36 countries from 2003 to 2013. Thanks 
to a recently released fiscal transparency index (R. F. Wang et al., 2015), a methodology is adopted that 
improve previous analysis by examining the causes of fiscal disclosure with a longitudinal analysis.  
In summary, some interesting remarks can be drawn from our results, especially from the dynamic 
models the  estimates of which allow us to identify causal links. In line with Alt et al. (2006), a higher 
control of the government over the parliament will lead to lower fiscal transparency, for the higher 
benefits deriving from secrecy. Contrary to previous findings (Alt et al., 2006; Andreula & Chong, 
2015) fractionalized legislatives have less interest in pursuing fiscal transparency, which suggests that 
fiscal transparency is affected by the “fragmentation problem” (Leachman et al., 2007). Indeed when 
legislative fractionalization is high the opposition parties may not be a credible threat to incumbents 
(Berliner, 2014), which may choose secrecy over transparency. Further, according to our findings 
GOV_SUP does not immediately exercise its influence over fiscal transparency, suggesting that this 
factor mostly matters in the policy design phase. On the other hand, political competition is found to 
immediately impact on fiscal transparency, suggesting that this factor matters in the policy 
implementation phase. Finally, no causal interpretation can be inferred from the analysis on the results 
for cabinet ideology, although the results  of the static model suggest that the presence of left-wing 
governments is correlated with higher fiscal transparency. 
Our analysis helps to shed more light on the effective causes of fiscal transparency by improving upon 
previous results. A better understanding of the complex interplay between politics and budgetary 
disclosure is important for two reasons: first, it will help public managers and reformers to determine 
under what conditions they can reasonably expect fiscal transparency to emerge as a common practice 
and how to improve the political setting which give rise to better fiscal governance agenda. Second, it 
will enable citizens to judge policymakers’ effort in improving fiscal transparency by observing the 
underlying political environment.  
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Tables and figures 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GFS fiscal transparency 
 
Overall 49.80 23.77 0 100 
Between  18.44 16.16 96.97 
Within  15.29 -27.47 89.20 
Note: Number of countries=36; Number of years=11; 
Within min and max refer to the variation from each 
country’s average. 
Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics of GFS level of transparency. Source: Wang et al., 2015. 
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Variable (LABEL) Modalities Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
                Cabinet composition 
(GOV_PARTY) 
Hegemony of right/center parties Dummy = 1 for a cabinet composition with hegemony of right or 
center parties 
395 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 Dominance of right/center 
parties 
Dummy = 1 for a cabinet composition with dominance of right or 
center parties 
     
 Balance of power between left 
and right 
Dummy = 1 for a cabinet composition with balance of power between 
left and right parties 
395 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 Dominance of left parties Dummy = 1 for a cabinet composition with dominance of right or 
center parties 
     
 Hegemony of left parties Dummy = 1 for a cabinet composition with hegemony of left parties 395 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 
 
      
Government support 
(GOV_SUP) 
 
Total government support: seat share of all parties in government, 
weighted by the number of days in office in a given year 
396 54.48 10.06 0 86.44 
       
Election year (ELECT)  Dummy = 1 for years of parliamentary elections (lower house) 396 0.28 0.45 0 1 
        
Rae fractionalization index 
(RAE) 
 Index of legislative fractionalization of the party system (Rae index*100) 396 70.08 10.27 48.34 88.14 
        
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics of political independent variables. Source: Comparative Political Dataset
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Variable 
(LABEL) 
Source Description Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
                Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
World Bank GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity in 
constant 2011 international 
dollars 
396 35413.24 14433.6 10849.26 96711.05 
 
  
     
Real GDP 
growth 
(REALGDPGR) 
Comparative 
Political Dataset 
Percentage GDP change from 
previous year 
396 1.90 3.64 -14.81 11.62 
 
  
     
Deficit 
(DEFICIT) 
Comparative 
Political Dataset 
Deficit (overall balance) as 
percentage of GDP 
395 -2.56 4.85 -32.55 18.696 
        
Population 
(POP) 
Comparative 
Political Dataset 
Total population, in thousands 389 28018.27 54565.24 289.3 316129 
        
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics of country control variables
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 Static model Dynamic model Dynamic model Dynamic model 
 GFS GFS GFS GFS 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Lagged GFS  0.58** 
(0.23) 
0.52*** 
(0.18) 
0.82*** 
(0.26) 
     
RAE -0.36* 
(0.21) 
-0.55** 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
     
Lagged RAE 0.57* 
(0.31) 
0.28 
(0.29) 
 
 
 
     
GOV_SUP -0.02 
(0.12) 
 -0.04 
(0.19) 
 
     
Lagged GOV_SUP -0.24** 
(0.11) 
 -0.12* 
(0.07) 
 
     
GOV_PARTY     
Dominance of 
right/center 
0.92 
(1.45) 
  9.43 
(14.48) 
     
Balance of power 3.21 
(2.22) 
  -0.50 
(13.08) 
     
Dominance of left 3.27* 
(1.70) 
  18.03 
(16.14) 
     
Hegemony of left 5.61* 
(2.84) 
  3.07 
(5.18) 
     
Lagged Dominance of 
right/center 
0.38 
(2.90) 
  6.06 
(11.70) 
     
Lagged Balance of power 1.57 
(1.95) 
  -2.52 
(7.19) 
     
Lagged Dominance of 
left 
-0.67 
(1.86) 
  10.45 
(14.57) 
     
Lagged Hegemony of left 3.37 
(4.21) 
  7.27 
(4.98) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N of observations 280 281 281 280 
N of units 36 36 36 36 
N. of instruments - 36 36 37 
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. ***=p-value<0.01 **=p-value<0.05 *=p-value<0.10. Base level for 
GOV_PARTY: Hegemony of right/center parties. Control variables: Election dummy, GDP p/c, real GDP 
growth, deficit, population. 
 
Tab. 4: Results of static and dynamic regressions 
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Fig. 1: Trends of GFS Fiscal Transparency by country 
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Fig. 2: Overall average of GFS fiscal transparency by year 
 
